My name is Marc Mulholland. I am a Fellow (lecturer and tutor) in the History Faculty of Oxford University. My College is St Catherine's. I come from Ireland.

This is a blog relating to my book published in 2012 by Oxford University Press, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservativism.
Now on sale here and here. If you want 20 per cent off the price, I can arrange that! Send me a message or leave a comment, and I'll tell you how.

The thesis my book is examining was rather pithily summarised by Leon Trotsky in 1939: "Wherever the proletariat appeared as an independent force, the bourgeoisie shifted to the camp of the counter-revolution. The bolder the struggle of the masses, the quicker the reactionary transformation of liberalism." [Context is here]

However, my book isn't a defence of Trotskyism, or indeed any particular ideology. It's a study of an idea that took shape in Left, Right, and Centre variations.

This blog has tid-bits not included in the book, and other thoughts that occur.

You can see book details at the
OUP website.



Monday, 23 July 2012

A Bourgeois French Revolution?


Was the French Revolution 'bourgeois'? There certainly was no hard division between bourgeois and aristocrat before 1789. By that year, the bourgeoisie owned 25 percent of the land, roughly the same proportion as did the aristocracy. However, there's little doubt that the revolutionaries - and the King's reformers - were consciously seeking to re-cast property rights to the putative advantage of all  property owners. Property rights were to be divested of 'feudal' property obligations. Here's William H. Sewell:

It would be no exaggeration to say that the French Revolution made private property the basic institution of the social and political order … this may be the only respect in which the Revolution still appears unproblematically bourgeois. … The Revolution of 1789 was not made by a distinct and unified bourgeois class. But given the revolutionaries’ extraordinary interest in the rights of private property, perhaps one could argue that it was a revolution for the bourgeoisie, even if it was not the bourgeoisie who guided it.
[William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘Property, Labor, and the Emergence of Socialism in France, 1789 – 1848' in John Merriman (ed), Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York, London: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 49.]

Between October 1789 and September 1790, there were no less than five National Assembly proclamations declaring freedom of commerce (though no worked out commercial code).This was not a concerted destruction of landed power, however, but a re-orientation to the market which was already well advanced before 1789. The elites strove to protect their own. Many landlords made up their income from the abolished feudal dues by contracting lease payments from sharecroppers, and they dominated commerce in grain through their direct ownership of substantial demesne farms.

The revolution was supposed to be consensual. But, as François Furet pointed out (Revolutionary France, 1770-1880), when the panacea of commerce failed to work its anticipated magic by dissolving old social antagonisms, recalcitrance in the face of modernity came to be to be re-defined as treacherous deviance and counter-revolutionary perversity. The revolutionaries' Terror of Virtue loomed.

Saturday, 21 July 2012

Death-bringing Parasitic Ivy

Wilhelm Liebknecht was a leader of the German workers' party, the SPD, and a frequent writer for its enormous range of newspapers (by which he made a quite incredibly huge amount of money). After fighting in the 1848 Revolution, he lived in exile in England for a good number of years, before returning to Germany in the 1860s. He was very close to Marx and Engels.  The latter were pretty scornful of Liebknecht in their private correspondence (as was their wont), but there was probably no one more important in implanting Marxism in Germany.

 
In the early 1870s, he occasionally intimated that the party was there to prepare for a violent social revolution. However, particularly as time went on, Liebknecht's line was that the SPD needed to complete the 'bourgeois revolution' - i.e. subordinating the executive government by making it responsible to the representative parliament - and then to win the 'battle of democracy': protecting universal suffrage against counter-coup, and having a workers' government elected. This was different from Britain and France, where constitutionalism was already established.

 
Here he is looking back on the circumstances of German unification in 1899:

 
In Germany where Capitalism was developed later than in England and France, and where it was not preceded, as in those two countries, by an era of economic prosperity for the bourgeoisie as well as of political supremacy by it, the whole political development was obliged to take on a different character. There [Britain and France] a soil cleared of medieval mould and undergrowth; here [Germany], the most modern of modern conditions, as modern as in France and England, in between medieval mould and undergrowth; the healthy growth entwined with ivy, which sucks the life out of everything that it clasps with its tendrils; which only lives from death and rottenness and which must be torn off and grubbed up to prevent the healthy and growing from being sacrificed to the dead.
The German bourgeoisie, which was sleeping the sleep of impotence at the time when in other lands the bourgeoisie impressed upon the state its bourgeois character, does not even now possess the strength to tear away and extirpate the romantic and death-bringing parasitic ivy of landlordism and medieval semi-barbarism.
The political impotence of the German citizenry in past and present is what distinguishes the political life of Germany from that of the other advanced countries, and has assigned to the German proletariat the mission not only of solving its own strictly proletarian problem, but also of accomplishing the work left undone by our bourgeoisie.
[Excerpted in William A. Pelz (ed.). Wilhelm Liebknecht and German Social Democracy: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 189.]

 
It has elements of the theory of Sonderweg, but perhaps without the suggestion that Germany was entirely unique.


Friday, 20 July 2012

Stamboliski and Bulgaria

When in my book I look at the revolutionary wave across Europe from 1918-21, I'm mostly interested in the workers' movement. However, there was something like a peasant revolution in Bulgaria. Russia had long been a significant influence, and the Communists were very strong. But they had to contend with a peculiarly agrarian dynamic. It was a remarkable episode that I could only refer to in passing.


Bulgaria before 1885 was ruled by the Ottoman empire. Its peasant population of Othodox Christian Slavs had little in common with Muslim landlords. The Russians particularly from 1828 posed as protectors of their fellow Orthodox Slavs, but in 1859 the Bulgarian church re-joined the broad Roman Catholic Communion (whilst retaining much of their Orthodox rites and married priests). This brought them under the sponsorship of France and Austria, the main Catholic powers.

In 1876, a Bulgarian Rising (organised from Roumania) led to savage repression. The notorious Bashi-bazouks, unleashed by the Ottomans, turned the eyes of Europe to the 'Bulgarian Horrors'. The Russians intervened, defeated the Ottomans, and tried to set up a client state. This 'Big Bulgaria' comprised Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, Wallachians, and Albanians. The Great Powers meeting in congress at Berlin feared Tsarist pretensions. They restored Macedonia to the Ottomans, made eastern Roumelia a self-governing province under a mixed administration, and left to 'small Bulgaria' the northern region. Bulgaria remained technically under the sovereignty of the Sultan, but with its own Prince. In 1879, the temporary Russian governor promulgated a constitution: a ministry government, an elected assembly, the Sobranje, elected by universal suffrage (though with a quarter of its members to be chosen by the prince) and the rule of law. The Prince, Alexander of Battenburg, was nominated by the Tsar, and after the Russians withdrew, they left behind military officers and much influence. Russia subversion was incessant thereafter.

With the Orthodox aristocracy eliminated, Bulgaria was in many respects cultually a democratic peasant-society: peasants, popes (priests), and schoolteachers. The bourgeoisie was significant, but small - mostly professional rather than in business. 

Alexander Gerschenkron used Bulgaria as an example contrary to W. W. Rostow's argument that countries industrialise more or less spontaneously once commercial freedom has been established and savings accumulated: despite these pre-conditions, there had been no 'take-off' in Bulgaria before World War One. Bulgaria's militarisation, culminating in the Second Balkan War, held it back.

After the Great War, Bulgaria re-established democracy. Then was the remarkable Staboliski episode. Aleksandar Stamboliski (1879 – 1923) was leader the Agrarian League, but with an international profile. Stambolisky saw himself as a man of the Left, but he was opposed to 'normal' party politics. He argued for a kind of plurastic corporatism or semi-anarchism, with socially based representative institutions based upon communities, workplaces and so on. In a peasant county, this meant peasant rule. He promoted the ‘Green International’, a peasant alternative to the various Workers' Internationals.

Stambolisky was caught up in an attempted peasant revolution in 1918, but survived its repression and became elected Premier in 1919.

Only in Bulgaria outside Russia did the Communists have really large-scale support in this early post-war period. The Communists, however, refused to ally with Stambuliski – they condemned his Peasant Party as the “bourgeoisie of the countryside”.

Stamboliski was violently hostile to lawyers and financiers, as exploiters of the peasantry, and demanded their exclusion from the Sobranje. Such few large estates as there were, Stamboliski wished to break up and redistribute with an Agrarian law. Though enjoying considerable popular support, he became increasingly dictatorial, and reliant upon his peasant 'Orange Guard'.

In June 1923, bourgeois interests and nationalist officers organised a coup against Stamboliski’s government in Sofia while the Prime Minister was away on business. Ministers were arrested, and Stambolisky fled across the frontier only to be captured, tortured and killed by Macedonian terrorists. Agrarian revolt in defence of Stambolisky’s government received no Communist aid and was easily suppressed. Only three months after the coup did the Communists, under Comintern pressure, organise their own resistance to the coup government. Leaders were arrested before their planned revolt. In the suppression of the rising, about 5000 were killed.

In April 1925 a Communist attempt to assassinate the Government as it convened in Sofia Cathedral, by detonating a bomb at the site, killed 123 persons but failed to dislodge the regime. Some 5000 subversives, mostly agrarians, were arrested.

When the Communists finally took power after the Second World war, they gradually gave up their hostility to Stamboliski's memory, and named a town after him. It bears that name still.



Thursday, 19 July 2012

Europe's Three Part Revolution. Part II

In a post a few days back, I suggested that the real difficulty for the Left in Europe at the end of the First World War was the dyed-in-the-wool hostility of the 'permanent state' - army, bureaucrats, police, judiciary, landlords, big-business - to democratisation. But this apparatus could not be simply picked apart without running the risk of general dissolution, civil war, and possibly invasion by the Entente Powers. Left in post, these traditionsal elites went on to facilitate the inter-war model of dictatorship.

It was the same 'permanent state' personnel, however, who collaborated with the German invaders and their allies during the Second World war. This time they did not avoid a reckoning. The state apparatus and business/landed elites could now be subjected to a far more thorough purge because of the frame of stability provided by the Allied armies. Societal dissolution and civil war was generally not a risk (with the odd exception) because occupying armies and administrations held the ring. Because the Allies had demanded unconditional surrender rather than a 1918 style armistice, they entirely smashed German militarism, and  occupied most of Europe. This permitted a far more thorough re-structuring of the state apparatus than had been conceivable after the Great War.

The outcome was a massive revolutionary re-ordering in continental Europe from about 1944 to 1946. It took the form of popular, Resistance led persecutions as well as a more ordered series of trials, vettings, and demotions overseen by Liberation governments. It was a rough affair, and a recent book on the period by Keith Lowe, Savage Continent, provides a searing study of the scapegoating and ethnic cleansing of the period. Years ago, R. W. Johnson wrote on the subject in the LRB, where he made a striking if disturbing analogy:

Criticism of the purge is easy. ‘Treason,’ as Talleyrand remarked, ‘is a matter of dates.’ And the sight of so many résistants de la dernière heure naturally encouraged cynicism. ‘Wasn’t the secret of the purge,’ Roger Peyrefitte wrote, ‘that there had to be victims so that there could be heroes?’ In a sense, it is difficult to take the opposite view: advocates of the purge were in much the same position as pro-abortion lobbyists today. No matter how just the cause, the hounding of terrified victims, like the termination of a foetus, is an irretrievably sad and ugly business: no one can feel any enthusiasm for it.
(Review of Herbert Lottman, The People's Anger: Justice and Revenge in Post-War France)
However, it is the case that most victims were guilty of collaboration (and most lost their jobs rather than their lives). Their removal from positions of power was seen as necessary for the consolidation of post-war democracy. Tony Judt heads his 'Retribution' chapter in Postwar with a quotation from Simone de Beauvoir: "Vengeance is pointless, but certain men did not have a place in the world we sought to construct." (p. 41). And a new world was constructed.

Still, the great purge of the 'permanent state' was not entirely complete, at least outside the Soviet Bloc. The Cold War from 1947 allowed not a few collaborators or fascist eminences to remain in post, or creep back in (often as expert advisors to emergent NATO, as they had fought the Red Army on the eastern front). These years really were the key moment in Europe's democratic transformation, but there was to be a significant coda. More on that anon.

Tuesday, 17 July 2012

Defining Revolution

A fairly recent paper in the History syllabus at Oxford is 'Disciplines of History'. The traditional methodological paper had three essays required to be written in three hours. In new-fangled 'Disciplines', it is two essays in three hours. So deep thought is required!

Usually, for the 'Comparative History' half of the Disciplines Paper, the topic of 'Revolutions' comes up. 'Revolution', of course, lends itself to transnational comparison. Following Perry Anderson's cogent reasoning, but to be honest also with some mind to manageability, I normally recommend to the students that they define 'revolution' as 'punctual': i.e. radical, but limited in time and space, even if the effect is quite diffuse. (Acute revolutions, natch, can succeed or fail to lesser or greater degrees; I'd be a poor Irishperson who refused a nod to the Memory of the Dead). But overall the definition of 'revolution' is up to my extraordinarily fab students. It can be quite non-political and drawn-out. Here's an invaluable guide, for example, to the 'Scientific Revolution'

https://vimeo.com/36015837

If students want to look at a long-drawn out process of revolution, 'Industrial', 'Scientific' or whatever, I say, 'go for it, emergent intelligentsia!'. I shall, however, have to pass you over to experts for guidance.

Here's Emma Dougherty, animator extraordinaire, and co-author of video above:

http://www.emmadougherty.com/contact.html

Bring us to Life

We historians need to bring our subject to life. So, hey!, let's pummel StopMoGo with our demands. The tres impressive chief ace-a-lot, I think, will see us right.

Rate Your Professor

This is just an addendum to yesterday's blog. I mentioned that in the aftermath of World War One the upper reaches of academia at least could be included (along with army officers, state bureaucracy, judges, and so on) in the reactionary 'permanent state' unhappy with democracy and its new freedoms for the upstart labour movement. This might seem a bit odd, when it has been argued that the academy is the very bedrock of democratic process and the open society. But it's well known, of course, that universities in inter-war Europe were bastions of conservatism or (amongst students at any rate) the radical-right.

Here is Franz Neumann writing mournfully in the Summer of 1919:

When I came in the spring of 1918 to the university of Breslau, its celebrated economist – in his very first lecture – denounced the Peace Resolution of 1917 (peace without annexations and indemnities) … When I came to Leipzig in the fall of 1918 … the [professorial] historian proved conclusively that democracy was an essentially non-German form of political organisation, suitable for the materialistic Anglo-Saxons, but incompatible with the ideals of the Germanic race.  When I transferred to Rostock in the summer of 1919, I had to organise students to combat anti-Semitism openly preached by the university professors. When I finally landed in Frankfurt, the very first task with which I was faced was to help protect a newly appointed socialist university professor from attack – political as well as physical – by students secretly supported by a considerable number of professors.
[Quoted in Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 45-6.]

It's worth bearing in mind that there was considerable continuity in the professoriat up until the 1960s, which is one reason for the student '68 (something I talk about in the book, and will come back to here).