My name is Marc Mulholland. I am a Fellow (lecturer and tutor) in the History Faculty of Oxford University. My College is St Catherine's. I come from Ireland.

This is a blog relating to my book published in 2012 by Oxford University Press, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservativism.
Now on sale here and here. If you want 20 per cent off the price, I can arrange that! Send me a message or leave a comment, and I'll tell you how.

The thesis my book is examining was rather pithily summarised by Leon Trotsky in 1939: "Wherever the proletariat appeared as an independent force, the bourgeoisie shifted to the camp of the counter-revolution. The bolder the struggle of the masses, the quicker the reactionary transformation of liberalism." [Context is here]

However, my book isn't a defence of Trotskyism, or indeed any particular ideology. It's a study of an idea that took shape in Left, Right, and Centre variations.

This blog has tid-bits not included in the book, and other thoughts that occur.

You can see book details at the
OUP website.



Showing posts with label French Revolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label French Revolution. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 July 2012

Georges Sorel and Two Types of Revolution

Georges Sorel had an interesting criticism of Marx's schema of social revolution. Here it is (1903 Preface to Edwin Seligman's Economic Interpretation of History [1903]; in French - apologies for my attempts at translation).

Marx had argued that as productive forces develop they press up against the integument of out-dated social and political relations, which is widely perceived as a constraint. At some point, the integument is burst asunder.

Marx, Sorel argues, based this model upon the French Revolution. (And on this revolution only; the model didn't apply to the transition from the Ancient World to feudalism, for example). It applied pretty well to France in the 1780s: clearly archaic tax and commercial codes constrained commercial relations; they simply "hindered and had no useful role in the production". Indeed (as I've noted) the French Revolution had initial support from many outside commerce, properly so-called, because all propertied classes at least could clearly see an advantage in clearing away the limits to growth.

Productive forces under capitalism, Sorel insisted, were not 'fettered' in the same way as they had been under 'feudal' social relations. There is no foreseeable end to the capacity for economic growth under capitalism. Rather, productive forces are subject to a boom-bust business cycle. They endure periodic collapse, followed at some point by renewed dynamism, but no indefinite stagnation for want of reform of social relations.

A proletarian revolution, moreover, would "exclude industrial leaders and deliver the productive forces to a [working] class without managerial experience". Revolution could not, at least in the short to medium term, emancipate productive forces.

The French Revolution in substance only required swift and fairly painless abolition of irksome remnants of 'feudalism' - famously swept away over one  night on 4 August 1789. The proletarian revolution requires a much more fundamental, protracted, and experimental transformation under the most un-propitious circumstances: "it is frightening to think of the huge quantitative difference between these two things Marx found so similar!"

One can imagine such thoughts would strike a chord with Syriza in Greece. A revolutionary crisis is not a good time to make a revolution. And who replaces the bourgeoisie?

The experience of communism seems to bear out much of Sorel's critique. Revolution in 1917 took place during conjunctural crisis - not just economic, to be sure - and the new regime was duly wracked by its unfolding. The Bolsheviks soon found that they relied upon ex-bourgeois and Tsarist experts to keep the economy running. In the long run, they trained up a new bureaucratic elite (killing much of the old) but there never clearly emerged a proletarian civil society able to rationalise the command economy. Whether a proletarian civil society can regulate a state and economy in a manner analogous to bourgeois civil society must be considered an open question.

Monday, 23 July 2012

A Bourgeois French Revolution?


Was the French Revolution 'bourgeois'? There certainly was no hard division between bourgeois and aristocrat before 1789. By that year, the bourgeoisie owned 25 percent of the land, roughly the same proportion as did the aristocracy. However, there's little doubt that the revolutionaries - and the King's reformers - were consciously seeking to re-cast property rights to the putative advantage of all  property owners. Property rights were to be divested of 'feudal' property obligations. Here's William H. Sewell:

It would be no exaggeration to say that the French Revolution made private property the basic institution of the social and political order … this may be the only respect in which the Revolution still appears unproblematically bourgeois. … The Revolution of 1789 was not made by a distinct and unified bourgeois class. But given the revolutionaries’ extraordinary interest in the rights of private property, perhaps one could argue that it was a revolution for the bourgeoisie, even if it was not the bourgeoisie who guided it.
[William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘Property, Labor, and the Emergence of Socialism in France, 1789 – 1848' in John Merriman (ed), Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York, London: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 49.]

Between October 1789 and September 1790, there were no less than five National Assembly proclamations declaring freedom of commerce (though no worked out commercial code).This was not a concerted destruction of landed power, however, but a re-orientation to the market which was already well advanced before 1789. The elites strove to protect their own. Many landlords made up their income from the abolished feudal dues by contracting lease payments from sharecroppers, and they dominated commerce in grain through their direct ownership of substantial demesne farms.

The revolution was supposed to be consensual. But, as François Furet pointed out (Revolutionary France, 1770-1880), when the panacea of commerce failed to work its anticipated magic by dissolving old social antagonisms, recalcitrance in the face of modernity came to be to be re-defined as treacherous deviance and counter-revolutionary perversity. The revolutionaries' Terror of Virtue loomed.