My name is Marc Mulholland. I am a Fellow (lecturer and tutor) in the History Faculty of Oxford University. My College is St Catherine's. I come from Ireland.

This is a blog relating to my book published in 2012 by Oxford University Press, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservativism.
Now on sale here and here. If you want 20 per cent off the price, I can arrange that! Send me a message or leave a comment, and I'll tell you how.

The thesis my book is examining was rather pithily summarised by Leon Trotsky in 1939: "Wherever the proletariat appeared as an independent force, the bourgeoisie shifted to the camp of the counter-revolution. The bolder the struggle of the masses, the quicker the reactionary transformation of liberalism." [Context is here]

However, my book isn't a defence of Trotskyism, or indeed any particular ideology. It's a study of an idea that took shape in Left, Right, and Centre variations.

This blog has tid-bits not included in the book, and other thoughts that occur.

You can see book details at the
OUP website.



Thursday, 12 July 2012

Parliamentarianism and Taxation

If bourgeois liberals never thought in terms of 'taking over' the state (still less 'smashing' it), why did they expect governments to concede a constitutionalism that paid due regard to civil society? Well, because governments want and need money. As Thomas Paine aptly said, parliamentary government "is the most productive machine of taxation ever invented". [Rights of Man, quoted in Gareth Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate (London: Profile, 2004), p. 22.] I go on about this in my book quite a lot. Rough conclusion: if there ever was such a thing as 'bourgeois revolution', it meant the tax-state conceding parliamentarianism (for its own ends) in the context of an economy based upon general commodification.

Here's a song mentioning Thomas Paine!

Wednesday, 11 July 2012

Wherein I say what Say Said about the Middling Classes

Part of my argument in Bourgeois Liberty ... is that Liberals and such applauded the bourgeoisie for its very particular attributes. In contrast to the working classes, the bourgeoisie had the time and energy to develop political rationality. But unlike the aristocracy they disavowed ambition to batten upon the state, because unlike courtiers and gentry etc. they did not rely for their living on politiking. The bourgeoisie, thus, provided an ideal support base for rational government: they would support the political executive without trying to take it over.

Here is Jean Baptiste Say making the point in his Traité d'économie politique - discours préliminaire (1814 edition):

For a long time it was thought that the science of political economy could only possibly be useful to the very limited number of persons engaged in the administration of public affairs. It is undoubtedly of importance that men in public life should be more enlightened than others ... But, is it possible for princes and ministers to be enlightened, when private individuals are not so? This is a question that merits consideration. It is in the middling classes of society, equally secure from the intoxication of power, and the compulsory labour of indigence, in which are found moderate fortunes, leisure united with habits of industry, the free intercourse of friendship, a taste for literature, and the ability to travel, that knowledge originates, and is disseminated amongst the highest and lowest orders of the people. For these latter classes, not having the leisure necessary for meditation, only adopt truths when presented to them in the form of axioms, requiring no further demonstration.
You can read it in context here [PDF].

The bit to highlight, perhaps, is this sentence: "It is in the middling classes of society, equally secure from the intoxication of power, and the compulsory labour of indigence ... that knowledge originates, and is disseminated amongst the highest and lowest orders of the people."

Part of the critique of the idea of 'bourgeois revolution' is that the bourgeoisie never seems to be seizing directly upon the state, which is what we tend to think of as 'revolution'. For nineteenth-century Liberals, however, it was precisely because the bourgeoisie lacked a political will to state-power that they were the foundation of a new kind of compact between government and civil society.

Tuesday, 10 July 2012

1914: Aggressive or Defensive War?


In 1907, the socialist parties of the Second International meeting in Stuttgart debated what position to take on war. Some delegates raised the problem that in modern military circumstances differentiating between (justified) defensive war and (unjustified) aggressive war might prove to be a difficulty. The German leader, August Bebel, waved away the problem:

It would be very sad if nowadays social democrats could not in every case determine with certainty whether a war is aggressive or defensive.
[Quoted in Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 25.]

However, the doubters were quite right. In an attempt to avoid mass, industrialised armies bogging down, it was vital for European mass-armies to attempt a quick victory by talking the offensive before the enemy had a chance to dig in. War had to be offensive. Major-General Sir Edward Spears, observing for the British Army French mobilisation in 1914, explained the rationale behind rigid timetables for war:

If the mobilisation is delayed or slow, the enemy will be enabled to advance with a fully equipped army against an unprepared one, which would be disastrous.
The time factor also makes it essential that the armies, once mobilised, should find themselves exactly where they can take up the role assigned to them. There is no opportunity for extensive manoeuvres: mobilisation is in itself a manoeuvre at the end of which the armies must be ready to strike according to the pre-arranged plan.
The plan is therefore obviously of vital importance. It has of necessity to be somewhat rigid, for it has to be worked out in every detail beforehand. From the moment mobilisation is ordered, every man must know where he has to join, and must get there in a given time. Each unit, once complete and fully equipped, must be ready to proceed at the appointed hour to a pre-arranged destination in a train awaiting it, which in turn must move according to a carefully prepared railway scheme. Each unit has also to drop into its place in the higher formations, and these again must find themselves grouped in position according to the fundamental plan. No change, no alteration is possible during mobilisation. Improvisation when dealing with nearly three million men and the movement of 4,278 trains, as the French had to do, is out of the question.

[This is quoted in a book now considered passé, but still very good in my view: A. J. P.Taylor's War by Time-Table: How the First World War Began (London: MacDonald & Co., 1969), p. 16.]

When war loomed, it was a race to ram troops into the offensive.

When the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, were assassinated by Serb nationalists in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, on 28 June 1914, Austria-Hungary determined to crush Serbia as the prime focus of Slav nationalism. Germany committed itself to supporting Austria on 6 July. Countenancing the possibility of a general war, Germany moved to activate the offensive Schlieffen Plan on 1 August, thus making war on Belgium and France inevitable. Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Reich, predicted to a colleague that,

It will be a violent storm but very short : I count on a war of three, or at most of four months, and I have organised all my policy on that assumption.
[Quoted in Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, British Strategy, Military and Economic: A Historical View and its Contemporary Lessons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), p. 131.]

By the time the Chancellor began to doubt whether a short war was possible, it was too late. The machine was in motion. Germany moved over 3 million men and 600,000 horses in 11,000 trains over a period of only 312 hours. [Hew Strachan, ‘Military Modernization, 1789 – 1918’ in T. C. W. Blanning (ed), The Oxford History of Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 2000), p. 87.]

The French, for their part, were committed to on the outbreak of war to launch Plan XVII, an immediate offensive against German held Alscace-Lorraine.

In 1914, almost everyone was attacking simultaneously: Austria against Serbia and Russia, Russia against Austria and Germany, Germany against Belgium and France, France against Germany. True, it was a pretty straight-forwardly defensive war for Belgium and Serbia (though Belgium was a major imperialist power, and Serbia itself was agressively militarist).

Of the major powers, Britain was not under immediate threat of attack: Germany wanted Britain to be neutral, not defeated.  Nonetheless, congruent with Britain’s interest that no one country dominate the resources of the continent, particularly if it had access to the channel ports by which Britain might be invaded, the United Kingdom committed itself, on 2 August, to the defence of France and Belgium. The Foreign Secretary believed that Britain’s commitment could be strictly limited: “We should risk little or nothing on land, and at sea we might shut the German fleet up in Kiel and keep it there without losing a ship or even firing a shot,” he argued. “With our trade intact, and our commerce secure, we should be very little worse off in the war than out of it.” [See here] Well that proved wrong! Italy only joined in 1915, in a clearly offensive war.

Overall, it was very hard for socialists in most countries to differentiate between offensive and defensive war in 1914. It's notable that socialists split between pro and anti war factions in Britain and Italy with least rancour (I'm excluding Mussolini, who left the socialist movement altogether), precisely because the choice was more open, and thus less agonising.
The collapse of the distinction between aggressive and defensive war was was less to do with a new 'stage of capitalism', as Lenin argued, than with military realities. It was a disaster waiting to happen.

Monday, 9 July 2012

Book Cover!

There's picture of the cover of my book up at Amazon (but not - oddly - up on the on-line OUP catalogue).



You'll see that there's a funny line running through the Amazon pic. Hopefully it'll not be there on the real thing!

Worth noting too that UK Book Depository offer the book at 25 percent off. What a bargain!

Revolutionary Germans in the Kaiserreich

It's often considered a bit of a mystery why the respectable German Social Democratic Party cleaved to a revolutionary Marxist programme before the First World war. One reason, of course, is that revolution was a relatively recent experience in Germany: the 1848 Revolutions lived in memory, and the Prussian constitutional crisis of the early 1860s had more of a pre-revolutionary feel than is usually admitted. If bourgeois liberals had only recently been revolutionary, socialists could hardly in honour be merely loyal subjects of a semi-authoritarian crown.

Perhaps more important still was the fact that the monarchical state - which was largely autonomous of direct popular control - was explictly anti-revolutionary, and would treat Social Democrats organizing workers as a revolutionary threat in potentia, no matter what rhetoric the socialists might employ. Typically, Kaiser Wilhelm II was blunt in making the point. Here's a report of a 1901 address by the Kaiser to soldiers of the conscript army just outside his royal residence:

Like a firm bulwark, your new barracks stand in the neighborhood of the palace, which it is primarily your duty to be ever ready to defend. The Emperor Alexander Regiment is called upon in a sense to stand ready as body-guard by night and by day and, if necessary, to risk its life and its blood for the King and his house; (the Emperor here called to mind the faithful bearing of the Alexander Regiment at the time of the revolts against the King in 1848) But if the city should ever again presume to rise up against its master then will the regiment repress with the bayonet the impertinence of the people toward their King.
[Christian Frederick Gauss (ed), The German Emperor, As Shown in His Public Utterances (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), p. 172.]

For a worker, subversion was impertinence: no wonder so many embraced it.

Sunday, 8 July 2012

'The treason of the Bourgeoisie'

I discuss in my book the allegation that, as  the working class developed as a force no longer under tutelege of the middle class, the bourgeoisie reacted by drifting from their radical reforming commitments. As we have seen here, the eminent liberal historian Benedetto Croce - no socialist he! - thought just this. The Revolutions of 1848 are often taken as a turning point from where the bourgeoisie lost its mojo. However, it needs to be recalled that the bourgeoisie had long been accused of sucking up to aristocratic power, and indeed were historically keen to become aristo themselves if at all possible. The legendary historian Fernand Braudel, in the second volume of his The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949, 1966), explicitly spoke of “the defection of the bourgeoisie”, when the bourgeois turned "class traitor" (p. 726). Braudel meant by this the tendency of urban families in the 16th Century, in seeking security, to move away from mercantilism into judicial and official pursuits. The exception to this pattern, however, was found in the Netherlands and England.

I think one may doubt whether one has to be in commerce as such to be a 'loyal' bourgeois. 'Career open to talents' is really the defining ideal of the bourgeoisie, and this can apply as much to state officialdom as to private prospects in the market-place. Indeed, bourgeois penetration of officialdom must have done quite a lot to shift state policy towards the bourgeois ideal over time.

Saturday, 7 July 2012

The Early Modern State and Capitalism

Christopher Hill is pretty much dismissed these days as a fusty old Marxist historian. Still, I wonder whether there'd be many on the liberal Right who'd be inclined to disagree with his view that the Early Modern English state was a block on development precisely because it was posing as “an instrument of economic power, maintaining monopolists and customs farmers, fining enclosures, [and] endangering property by arbitrary taxation”? [Christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century (London, 1958), p. 28]


Francis Fukuyama, and Niall Ferguson, of course, are happy to take the bull by the horns (and they do so most impressively), by re-casting the old Marxist (and older Whiggish) narrative in neo-liberal terms. Marx's emancipatory classes are replaced by something a bit closer to Hegel's World Spirit of transcendant reason, animated by contingency and transhistorical rational economic man. Still, there's been something of a reversion to the idea of the 'bourgeois as hero' in recent historical writing, though with the rider that, at the end of history, everyone is bourgeois.