My name is Marc Mulholland. I am a Fellow (lecturer and tutor) in the History Faculty of Oxford University. My College is St Catherine's. I come from Ireland.

This is a blog relating to my book published in 2012 by Oxford University Press, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservativism.
Now on sale here and here. If you want 20 per cent off the price, I can arrange that! Send me a message or leave a comment, and I'll tell you how.

The thesis my book is examining was rather pithily summarised by Leon Trotsky in 1939: "Wherever the proletariat appeared as an independent force, the bourgeoisie shifted to the camp of the counter-revolution. The bolder the struggle of the masses, the quicker the reactionary transformation of liberalism." [Context is here]

However, my book isn't a defence of Trotskyism, or indeed any particular ideology. It's a study of an idea that took shape in Left, Right, and Centre variations.

This blog has tid-bits not included in the book, and other thoughts that occur.

You can see book details at the
OUP website.



Tuesday, 14 August 2012

Finance and the Decline of the West

Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West (1918), published just after World War One in Germany, was a massive hit internationally at the time. In it, Spengler attempted a kind of universal history of civilisations. It had a big influence on Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History (1934-61), which attempted a similar kind of universal schematic history, shorn of Germanic quasi-mysticism.

What did Spengler predict for the future? He argued that capitalism – “the economy of the machine-industry” as he called it  – had empowered  the worker, the engineer and the entrepreneur. Over-arching all three classes, however, was the malign controlling influence of finance, “the banks … [and] the bourses [stock exchanges]", which had grown up parasitically on "the credit needs of an industry grown ever more enormous.” Parliamentary democracy, which was particularly susceptible to manipulation by conniving banks and the imperious demands of the bond markets, was the natural form of the dictatorship of finance-capital. (Lenin said something similar).

This “dictature of money”, he prophesied, must inevitably be challenged by the will of the people. The masses could not organise themselves, however. They must need be led by a vanguard of engineers (by which he meant, roughly, the managerial and artisanal middle-class). They would save civilization in this epic conflict between “blood and money”.

In due course, Spengler was confident that the “master-will” of the people's leaders would triumph over the “plunderer-will”.  A natural elite would re-make society by uniting the popular will with unfettered executive government: “The coming of Caesarism breaks the dictature of money and its political weapon democracy.”

Spengler was obviously looking back to  Caesarian heroes such as Napoleon and Bismarck. He also, of course, anticipated fascism.

Parliamentary democracy as the handmaiden of big finance is hardly a fantasic conspiracy theory in our time. It's an ominous thought that, suitably modified, Spengler's arguments could well appeal to sections of both radical left and radical right today

[Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: Perspectives of World-History, vol. II, trans. Charles Franis Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922), p. 504 – 6.]

Monday, 13 August 2012

Maurice Dobb on Popular Frontism

Here's British Communist intellectual Maurice Dobb in 1937 explaining the turn to the Popular Front (an alliance of the left with bourgeois parties in opposition to fascism). Popular Frontism, on the face of it, was in direct contradiction to the Leninist dictum that in advanced capitalist ('imperialist') countries, the bourgeoisie had become entirely reactionary. Dobb argued that this new turn was justified by the exacerabation of just those tendencies identified by Lenin. The bourgeoisie, bound to the imperialist state, had lost its drive towards liberalism inherent in the days of competitive capitalism (as Max Weber had also argued). The further development of aggressive protectionism and imperialism,

are already exerting an influence on the social structure in the home countries of so radical a kind as to constitute a political landmark of no small importance. I refer to the disintegrating effect of recent economic effects on the various middle strata of the metropolitan economy. The economic position of these strata has many links, direct and indirect, with the colonial system; and with any shrinkage of colonial super-profit this position, becomes immediately insecure. But it is also to a large extent these strata who are adversely affected by the new stage of intensified monopolistic development in the home country, in particular by the increasing emphasis on the purely restrictive aspect of this development, such as economic nationalism and the paralysis of foreign trade, price control by cartels and restriction-schemes, which are apt to bear with special heaviness on the small producer as well as the consumer. That the increasing radicalisation of the this so-called ‘middle class’, which we are witnessing today, and their willingness to align themselves (for the first time since 1848) with the proletariat in an organized ‘people’s front’ of ‘the left’ is connected with a fundamental modification of their economic position in contemporary society, is a suggestion to which too little attention has been paid.

[Maurice Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism: Some Essays in Economic Tradition (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 263-4.]

It's an interesting, if tortured attempt to explain a volte face whilst saving the phenomena.

Sunday, 12 August 2012

Corporate Capitalism and the Origins of Communism

From about 1870, many on the Left began to worry that a new corporate capitalism was undermining the long-assumed association between liberty and bourgeois civil society. Here's David Beetham, from a very interesting article:

"Even a liberal such as Max Weber was compelled to admit that there was little similarity between the small scale competitive capitalism of the classical bourgeois period, and the cartellized, bureaucratized systems of production and labour control of his own day, at least in respect of their implications for political freedom. 'It is ridiculous in the extreme', he wrote in his 1905 study of the prospects for bourgeois democracy in Russia, 'to ascribe to modern advanced capitalism …any affinity with “democracy” or even “freedom” (in any sense of the word). All the forms of development are excluded which in the West put the strong economic interests of the possessing classes in the service of the movement for bourgeois liberty.'"

[David Beetham, 'Civil Society: Market Economy and Democratic Polity' in Civil Society in Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 79]

It was partly this apparent de-coupling of capitalism and liberty that eventually led radicals like Lenin to disavow the traditional socialist policies of supporting the bourgeoisie insofar as it struggles with reaction, or of seeking power through - rather than against - parliamentarianism.

Saturday, 11 August 2012

With Friends like these ...

In 1642, when civil war finally erupted between Monarch and Parliament in England, only twelve of the King’s Privy Council of 1640 sided with the King, while six sided with Parliament, and six remained neutral.

Way to spot loyalty, Charles!

(Serious point: this war split the nobility. It also split the merchants etc. It wasn't a stand-off between a bourgeoisie one side, aristocracy the other).

Friday, 10 August 2012

Thatcher: 'Quite Feminine, but Totally in Control'

Now in the shops, a new book about Margaret Thatcher, written by historians. The impressive roster of contributers include Ben Jackson, Robert Saunders, Jim Tomlinson, Matthew Grimley, Camilla Schofield, Laura Beers, Jon Lawrence, Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, David Howell, Richard Finlay, Richard Vinen, Andrew Gamble, Stephen Howe, Peter Sloman.

 It's called Making Thatcher's Britain. Here is its colourful cover-pic:


I've got a chapter in the book. It's called ''Just another country?': the Irish question in the Thatcher years'. Have a gander at this excerpt to whet your appetite:

On 15 November, 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by Margaret Thatcher and [Irish Premier] Garret Fitzgerald at Hillsborough Castle, County Down. Thatcher cut an impressive figure. Fitzgerald was carefully spoken, but nowhere near as ‘authoritative and clear spoken’ as his counterpart, an Irish minister admitted: ‘Thatcher is undoubtedly the sharpest thing out, she looked very well (how can she be 60!), quite feminine, but totally in control and totally on the ball.’ This belied the Irish negotiating triumph, however …

None of the chapters are too long, and there's lots of good things to read. So rush off and buy it!

Thursday, 9 August 2012

How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions?

Well, I've finished the second recent book other than mine with 'bourgeois' in the title (the other is by Jerrold Seigel). I'm talking about Neil Davidson's massive tome, How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions. This must come in at about 300,000 words, so it's no small read (this makes the price it's being sold at all the more impressive. You get a lot of value for your pounds!)



The length is partly explained by Davidson generosity in quoting his large cast of writers quite so exhaustively, sometimes rather exhaustingly. It's true, also, that there are also a good number of excurses that seem pretty tangential to the main theme. One can find, for example, a long digression on Walter Benjamin, which serves to establish the rather startling claim that we can only hope to truly understand the events of history after the “socialist revolution”. (328) Trotsky's theory of 'Uneven and combined development' is lengthily discussed as befits the most "important discovery in C20th Marxism". (286) There's also a lot of returns to the post Jacobite 'revolution from above' in Scotland. These, of course, are especially welcome, as deriving from Davidson's research specialism.

[I'll forgive his claiming James Connolly as a Scot (182), though Connolly's ghost might disagree: "The socialists will never understand why I am here; they will all forget that I am an Irishman".]

As one can tell, this is a book from a politically committed stand-point. Davidson deprecates the “false impartiality and narrow specialization” of academic life. (277) - though he does have time for some “conservative materialist historians” (464), particularly Norman Stone. He chides historians for refusing to draw enlightenment from Lenin's polemical Two Tactics (338). The author implies that he shares, with Marx and Engels, an epistemologically privileged position: because they adopted the standpoint of the proletariat, they understood the bourgeoisie better than the bourgeoisie understood themselves. (125)

More particularly, this book comes from a Leninist perspective, so that poor old Kautsky, as is usual, finds himself roughly handled (220, 237). (Indeed, really quite unfairly - an accusation of dishonestly levelled against Kautsky by Radek, and retailed here, is baseless as far as I can see from Davidson's own copious evidence). Right-thinking Marxists have only “revulsion” for Second International determinism. (521) The Leninist revolutionary party was a great innovation and as necessary now as ever (223, 504, 629). Not least of Stalin's crimes was to adopt the position of the Second International and Menshevism (249).
 
More particularly again, Davidson identifies with the Trotskyist position. Thus, Popular Frontism was “entirely reactionary” (434).  A rather unexceptional version of Marxist thinking on the 'bourgeois revolution' is summarily dismissed as absurd because of its Stalinist provenance. (254-55) Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution gets an extremely thorough, adept, and fascinating treatment.

Most particularly of all, Davidson defends - and spends a considerable amount of effort defending - the political positions associated with the tradition of Tony Cliff's SWP. We can see this in some SWP tics - references to theoretical 'stick-bending', for example, or quoting Shakespeare on the 'flood-tide of human affairs' as a warrant for emancipatory catastrophism (174, 283-4).

A lot of time is spent arguing that the orthodox-Trotskyist desciption of the USSR - as a "degenerated workers' state" (and its command economy off-spring as 'deformed workers' states')  - is incoherent. This is entirely fair no doubt, if of limited significance outside Trotskyist debates. (It seems that we should designate Soviet Union a "degenerated workers state" up to 1928, so there appears to be not so much of a theoretical principle at stake (450))

Whether it's at all useful to consider, as did Tony Cliff, the communist command economies as 'state capitalist' is another matter. Davidson seems to accept the Brenner definition of capitalism as involving a process of competitive accumulation that forces both owners of capital and direct producers to continually drive up productivity (400). This definition appears almost entirely inapplicable to communist command economies. I can't see much use in defining such regimes, even though certainly committed to developmental industrialisation, as capitalist in any form, still less products of bourgeois revolution.

Amidst all of those considerations, and other often brilliant discussions of such themes as Scottish Enlightenment, 'revisionism', the Brenner Debate, and so on, Davidson's actual definition of the 'bourgeois revolution' is rather obscured. He does state it on page 420:

The theory of bourgeois revolution is not … about the origins and development of capitalism as a socioeconomic system but the removal of backward looking threats to its continued existence and the overthrow of restrictions to its further development. The source of these threats and restrictions has, historically, been the pre-capitalist state, whether estates-monarchy, absolutist, or tributary in nature ... .

Broadly speaking, Davidson is a 'consequentialist': revolution need only promote capitalism in the future to be classified as 'bourgeois'. It does not require bourgeois leadership. The political programme of any bourgeois revolution is almost by the way. When revolutionaries talked of
“religious or constitutional liberties” this was only a kind of "false consciousness". (565, 619). In 1640s England, 1790s France, 1860s United States, etc., "leaders, consciously or unconsciously, had to mobilize the masses under ultimately deceptive slogans of universal right" because otherwise workers, peasants etc. would fail to stir themselves simply to swap old feudal oppression for new capitalist exploitation (145):

In no bourgeois revolution did the revolutionaries ever seek to rally popular forces by proclaiming their intention to establish a new form of exploitative society … but did so by variously raising demands for religious freedom, representative democracy, national independence, and, ultimately, socialist reconstruction ... (510)

This last reference to 'socialist reconstruction' is because Davidson sees all communist seizures of power (except Russia 1917) as instances of bourgeois revolution. The last bourgeois revolutions, therefore, were in 1973-5: the Communist coup in Ethiopia, US defeat in Indochina, and decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire. (621)

What's my overall view? I'm extremely impressed by the sheer learning packed into this book, and the sophistication of its argumentation. I've learnt a huge amount from it. It maintains a focused and engaging prose style throughout. It really is an impressive piece of work. I wish I'd read it before I'd finished my own book. My own views, however, are quite different, and remain so. But I've gone on too long, so will only recommend here that you read for yourself.

Wednesday, 8 August 2012

Tories: Natural Party of Government, or of Opposition?

When the bulk of the Tory Party repudiated Robert Peel in 1846, most of the party's talented leadership went with him. The Tories settled - rather contentedly - into being the 'stupid party', not interested in developing policy innovations as much as doggedly holding-up and moderating  the course of change. This, many Tories felt, could be done as well, in fact better, from the Opposition benches. In government, promoting reform is unavoidable. From Opposition, change can be obstructed and controlled.

Benjamin Disraeli had famously characterised Tory government as 'organized hypocrisy', for the very demands of governance must inevitably pull the party from its true function: voicing scepticism in the face of all attempts at 'improvement', championing conservation of traditional ways hallowed by age and usage. But, in fact, Disraeli didn't much enjoy the calculated obduracy of the Tory squires, and he set himself the task of making the Tories once more the 'natural party of government'. They became so by the 1880s, and held on to that role for most of the twentieth century.

The 90 Tory MPs who opposed House of Lords reform seemed pretty indifferent to the near inevitability of Clegg's revenge. But the price of their rebellion, failure to reform constituency boundaries, substantially decreases the chance of a Tory government from 2015. Is Opposition a price worth paying for delaying Lords reform for a few years? Are these backbenchers consciously attracted to the old Tory tradition of opposition for opposition's sake?